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 Impression Management and Non-GAAP Disclosure  
in Earnings Announcements 
Abstract  
We study the market reaction to the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures 
that are combined with high impression management. We construct an impression 
management score that includes several communication techniques that managers 
often use to positively bias investors’ perceptions of firm’s performance. We hand-
collect and code quantitative and qualitative information from earnings 
announcement press releases of large European firms. Our results indicate that 
non-GAAP measures are informative to capital markets. However, non-GAAP 
adjustments are more persistent when accompanied by higher levels of impression 
management. This evidence is consistent with managers trying to distort users’ 
perceptions when non-GAAP adjustments are of lower quality. Market reaction 
tests suggest that investors are able to see through managers’ intentions and ignore 
non-GAAP information that is accompanied by high impression management. 
Moreover, investors in sophisticated markets penalize non-GAAP measures 
communicated with high impression management. Our results are robust to a 
battery of sensitivity tests, including using a machine-coded tone measure. 
Keywords: pro forma earnings; alternative performance measures; street earnings; 
disclosure tone; emphasis; sophisticated investors; shareholders’ protection. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Non-GAAP measures can be disclosed to inform capital markets about recurring performance or 
to portray a firm’s performance in an optimistic manner, a practice that may mislead investors. We study 
the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures that are accompanied by impression management 
communication techniques, and explore how this varies across institutional environments. Impression 
management is a process in which managers select and present information, either qualitative or 
quantitative, in a way that distorts users’ perceptions of corporate achievements (Neu et al., 1998).  
Our results indicate that non-GAAP measures are informative to capital markets. However, we 
find evidence consistent with managers using high levels of impression management to mask the 
recurring nature of some non-GAAP adjustments. We also find that investors perceive this combination 
to be strategic and penalize firms for this behavior. Thus, while there is a positive market reaction to non-
GAAP adjustments, on average, investors ignore the adjustments that are accompanied by high 
impression management. The country-level results suggest that this reaction is more pronounced in 
environments with a stronger presence of sophisticated financial statement users (institutional investors 
and financial analysts), and stronger investor protection. 
Since markets value persistent earnings (Collins and Kothari, 1989), firms have incentives to 
separate permanent and transitory earnings components. However, earnings measurement and disclosure 
is constrained by GAAP and subject to monitoring. In their search for more flexible ways to convey 
information about earnings persistence managers have turned to voluntarily disclose non-GAAP in 
earnings press releases. Prior research suggests that investors perceive non-GAAP earnings to be 
informative (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002), but expresses concerns about the 
possibility of strategic disclosure to positively bias investors’ perceptions (Andersson and Hellman, 2007; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2007; Cormier et al., 2011). Therefore, the challenge for investors and regulators is to 
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allow management freedom to use non-GAAP earnings to communicate key earnings components while 
simultaneously limiting opportunistic management of GAAP earnings (Young, 2014). 
In contrast to the US where regulation constrains non-GAAP disclosure, in Europe non-GAAP 
disclosure is virtually unregulated. In addition, capital markets and institutional mechanisms are less 
developed in Europe than in the US, suggesting that the potential for these disclosures to mislead 
investors can be high. The European Financial Reporting Advisory Group, an organization which 
provides the European Commission with technical advice on accounting matters, has stressed that non-
GAAP disclosures of large European firms are inconsistent and obscure (EFRAG, 2009). Consistent with 
these concerns, the European Securities and Markets Authority recently published a set of guidelines for 
the disclosure of non-GAAP measures (ESMA, 2015). 
 While non-GAAP earnings be used to manage investors’ perceptions, they are not the only 
communication tool available to managers. Earnings press releases offer great flexibility regarding both 
the format and the style of the message.1 Previous studies, examining the location of non-GAAP earnings 
in press releases, find that firms commonly place non-GAAP earnings more prominently than GAAP 
measures, and that the higher relative emphasis affects the judgements of some investors (Allee et al., 
2007; Bowen et al., 2005; Elliott, 2006; Isidro and Marques, 2015). We extend these results by examining 
multiple communication strategies, which we refer to as impression management techniques. Thus, we 
provide a comprehensive analysis, considering that investors’ reactions may be affected by (1) the use of 
                                                 
1
 Press releases are widely used by the business community and offer ample opportunity for discretionary disclosures. Prior 
research finds evidence of strategic use of communication techniques, such as positive language tone, to influence investors’ 
perceptions about firm performance (Huang et al., 2014; Lang and Lundholm, 2000). Prior studies also find the use of 
impression management to be associated with other strategic behaviour, such as earnings management (Aerts and Cheng, 
2011; Godfrey et al., 2003).  
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positive tone; (2) the emphasis given to non-GAAP measures, and (3) the use of performance 
comparisons (selecting benchmarks that give the impression of performance achievement). We consider 
emphasis in terms of (i) location of the measure in the press release, (ii) the repetition of non-GAAP 
information, and (iii) the reinforcement of keywords. We use content analysis to construct a firm-year 
score of impression management related to non-GAAP disclosures.  
 Whether or not investors perceive the combination of the impression management with non-
GAAP disclosures to be misleading is an important empirical question. If European investors are capable 
of recognizing this type of disclosure, then strict regulation, which is costly to design and to enforce, may 
not be necessary. We hand-collect data and hand-code non-GAAP and impression management practices 
from the first two sections of firms’ earnings announcements press releases. This focus is consistent with 
Entwistle et al. (2006), who state that the headline is “the portion of the press release with highest profile, 
the language which is first read and which tends to be picked up by the financial press and newswire”.  
In the spirit of Frankel et al. (2011) and Jennings and Marques (2011) we analyze the cross-
sectional variation in the persistence of non-GAAP adjustments to make inferences about informative 
versus opportunistic intentions. Consistent with these studies, we find that the non-GAAP adjustments 
made by large European firms are generally recurring in nature. We extend literature by documenting that 
non-GAAP adjustments that are accompanied by high impression management are more persistent (i.e., 
of lower quality).  
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Our first hypothesis explores whether investors’ reaction to non-GAAP disclosures around the 
earnings announcement date varies with the level of impression management.2 In line with prior studies, 
which mostly use US data, we find an overall positive market response to non-GAAP disclosures. 
However, investors ignore non-GAAP disclosures that are accompanied by high impression management. 
This result suggests that investors interpret the combination of the two disclosure tools as a possible 
managerial attempt to mask the persistence of the non-GAAP adjustments made. This evidence is in line 
with prior findings that investors react to the tone of managers’ communications (Baginski et al., 2011; 
Davis et al., 2012; Demers and Vega, 2011), but that they are capable of detecting strategic 
communication (Barton and Mercer, 2005; Huang et al., 2014). Another important result is that the 
market reaction is not limited to language tone. We find a similar market reaction to other communication 
techniques, such as emphasis and performance comparisons.3 
This evidence begs the question of why investors in European markets are able to “see through” 
firms’ disclosure strategy, while results for the US suggest that unsophisticated investors are not able to 
do so. Although our measure of emphasis is not directly comparable with the measure of emphasis used 
in US studies, we discuss three possible explanations: (i) there are more sophisticated investors in 
European capital markets than in the US, (ii) investors are more familiar with non-GAAP disclosures in 
                                                 
2
 One could argue that, given the difficulty of identifying who writes the press release (Garcia Osma and Guillamon-Saorin, 
2011; Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007), it is unlikely that the person preparing the press release is the same person who 
determines the non-GAAP exclusions and its presentation in the press release. The contra argument is that the manager is the 
person accountable for the content of the press release. Given the lack of evidence in the literature, we can assume that the 
quality of firm communication is an equilibrium outcome (Ball, 2006), which implies consistent quality levels across the range 
of reported information prepared within a firm, regardless of the number of parties involved (Gronstedt, 1996). This leads to 
the general expectation that impression management and non-GAAP information are positively associated. 
3
 Prior research for the US shows that investors are sensitive to the location of non-GAAP measures, when compared with the 
location of GAAP figures, and that location can be used strategically by managers (Elliott, 2006). This measure is referred to 
as “relative emphasis” in Bowen et al. (2005). Our measure is more comprehensive than the ones used before, as it includes 
not only location but also repetition and reinforcement (See Figure 1). 
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Europe than in the US, and (iii) there has been a learning effect through time, as discussion on non-
GAAP in Europe has increased recently.  
We subsequently evaluate the extent to which countries’ institutional and market conditions 
influence investors’ reaction to the combination of non-GAAP disclosure and high impression 
management. International research documents that institutional and economic factors such as the level of 
investors’ protection, the quality of enforcement mechanisms, and the sophistication of market 
participants affect reporting transparency (Bushman et al., 2004; Holthausen, 2009; Lang et al., 2012). In 
these settings, investors are also more likely to have the means to perceive and discount aggressive 
disclosures in these environments. We find that the market reaction to the combination of non-GAAP 
disclosures with high impression management is statistically negative in countries with more 
sophisticated market participants (i.e. financial analysts and institutional investors), and stronger investor 
protection. These results suggest that while the investors in more sophisticated markets penalize the non-
GAAP adjustments surrounded by high impression management (maybe understanding the persistence of 
the adjustments made), investors in less-sophisticated markets do not react to these adjustments (maybe 
perceiving them as cheap talk). Our results are robust to self-selection bias. 
This study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature in three ways. First, it indicates that 
managers complement disclosures of non-GAAP financial measures with impression management 
techniques. While prior research studies on management communication focus mostly on language tone, 
we investigate a wide range of impression management techniques, related to qualitative and quantitative 
information, and assess the market reaction to the combination of these techniques with non-GAAP 
disclosures. Second, we provide evidence that investors’ reaction to the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings 
with high impression management varies with institutional and economic conditions. Third, we provide 
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some useful insights for European regulators, since the recent guidelines do not apply to press releases.  
The design of a regulatory solution can take into account the fact that markets seem to be able to identify 
certain strategic non-GAAP disclosures, particularly sophisticated markets.   
 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Investors use earnings information to predict future earnings and future returns. The accuracy of 
these predictions depends on earnings persistence, and prior research suggests that market participants 
reward persistence (Collins and Kothari, 1989). The possibility of market rewards, as well as reputation 
and compensation motives, gives managers’ incentives to provide investors self-constructed earnings 
measures that exclude transitory items from GAAP earnings. Consistent with this idea, prior research 
reports that investors perceive non-GAAP performance measures to be more informative about future 
earnings than GAAP earnings, both in the US (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002), and 
in the UK (Lin and Walker, 2000; Choi et al., 2007).4 
Because non-GAAP earnings disclosures are not regulated in Europe, and are based mostly on the 
exclusion of expenses, there is a greater potential for investor misleading in Europe than in the US. While 
some managers may adjust GAAP earnings to provide a better measure of permanent earnings, others 
may exclude recurring items in an attempt to enhance investors’ perceptions of the persistence of firm’s 
profitability. Whether or not the users of non-GAAP  information can see through managers’ strategic 
disclosures depends upon their knowledge and ability to detect them (Christensen et al., 2014).  
                                                 
4
 The UK is a special case in Europe, because its Financial Reporting Standard 3 permits UK firms to report non-GAAP EPS 
numbers in the face of the income statement. To ensure transparency, firms are required to reconcile these numbers to the 
GAAP figure. 
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Andersson and Hellman’s (2007) experimental evidence in an European context suggests that even 
financial analysts can be misled by non-GAAP disclosures. European markets are typically viewed as 
having weaker investor protection, and poorer enforcement quality than US markets (La Porta et al., 
2006). These conditions may prompt more aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Accordingly, it is not clear, 
ex ante, that investors will be able to detect impression management ploys and appropriately discount the 
non-GAAP adjustments. We examine this important question.  
We predict that managers use impression management techniques, a cosmetic disclosure tool 
involving potentially several practices that can distort investors’ perceptions of firms’ performance (such 
as disclosure tone effects, strategic presentation of performance comparisons, or strategic emphasis), to 
hide the recurring nature of certain non-GAAP adjustments. Frankel et al. (2011) and Jennings and 
Marques (2011) argue that if the excluded items are purely transitory, their persistence should be close to 
zero, consistent with managers’ claims that the adjustments are informative. On the contrary, evidence 
that managers adjust for recurring earnings components signals managers’ purpose is not to inform, but 
rather to alter investors’ perception of firm performance. We contend that when managers exclude 
recurring expenses they use impression management in their earnings communications to persuade 
investors that the non-GAAP figures represent persistent earnings better than GAAP earnings.  
Our argument of strategic disclosure is in line with the growing evidence on the use of impression 
management practices in earnings announcement press releases, such as language tone, to influence 
users’ perceptions of firm performance (e.g. Huang et al., 2014; Sadique et al., 2008; Tan et al., 2014). 
However, tone is just one of several impression management techniques. Earlier studies find that US 
firms with less value-relevant GAAP earnings disclose non-GAAP measures before the GAAP figures 
(Bowen et al., 2005), and that giving more emphasis to non-GAAP than GAAP can affect non-
9 
 
professional investors’ judgements (Elliott, 2006; Allee et al., 2007). A recent study indicates that 
European firms commonly disclose non-GAAP measures before the GAAP figures in press releases 
(Isidro and Marques, 2015). Thus, we anticipate that managers may use several impression management 
techniques to communicate non-GAAP information (Bowen et al., 2005; Garcia Osma and Guillamon-
Saorin, 2011; Huang et al., 2013; Lewellen et al., 1996; Schrand and Walther, 2000). To capture various 
communication techniques, we create an impression management score associated with non-GAAP 
measures that contains both quantitative and qualitative information.5 If managers use impression 
management to enhance the creditability of their non-GAAP earnings measures and to obscure the 
recurring nature of their adjustments then the impression management score will be greater when 
managers’ non-GAAP adjustments are more persistent.  
Several empirical studies document the capital market effects of manager communication 
practices such as disclosure tone (Baginski et al., 2011; Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012). The fact that 
investors incorporate tone in their stock valuations is not the same as saying that they are not aware of 
self-serving management communications tactics. “Cheap talk” models predict that corporate 
communication is costless, non-binding, and unverifiable, and therefore ignored by investors 
(Bhattacharya and Krishnan, 1999; Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Evidence consistent with both the 
informational and “cheap talk” arguments suggests that investors are capable of distinguishing between 
more- and less-credible messages (Barton and Mercer, 2005; Tan et al., 2014). This evidence suggests 
that investors can penalize firms when they perceive that managers use the discretion allowed in 
                                                 
5
 Qualitative information is subject to interpretation by readers and can be easily biased (Behn and Vaupel, 1982). For this 
reason, managers who intend to persuade users to embrace a certain belief are likely to make more use of qualitative 
disclosures. Quantitative disclosures, on the other hand, are more precise and can be verified ex-post (Healy and Palepu, 2001), 
but they can also be biased by managers through presentation techniques. For these reasons, a combination of both qualitative 
and quantitative information, which yields a more comprehensive score, is used in our study. 
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corporate communications to overstate performance. If investors respond similarly in the case of non-
GAAP disclosures then they will interpret non-GAAP measures communicated in combination with high 
impression management as an attempt to portray recurring expenses as transitory expenses. As a result, 
we should observe a negative market reaction to non-GAAP earnings disclosures with high impression 
management, assuming that lower quality exclusions are associated with higher impression management. 
On the other hand, if market participants are not able to see through the strategic combination of the two 
disclosure mechanisms, then there will be no difference in the reaction to non-GAAP information with 
higher or with lower impression management. We state our first hypothesis in the alternative form as 
follows:  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Investors react differently to non-GAAP disclosures that are combined with high 
impression management in earnings announcements. 
European markets are  characterized by wide variation in (i) market sophistication, (ii) regulation, 
and (iii) enforcement (Bushman et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 2006). Isidro and Marques (2015) show that 
country-level institutional conditions affect non-GAAP disclosure practices, when the GAAP figure 
misses an earnings benchmark. Thus, it is possible that the market response to non-GAAP disclosures 
combined with high impression management varies across market characteristics.  
We focus on two important country characteristics: (1) market’s sophistication and (2) strength of 
regulation aimed at protecting minority investors. A higher level of overall market sophistication should 
be associated with a richer information environment and a better understanding of managers’ strategic 
choices. Sophisticated users, such as analysts and institutional investors, collectively produce, gather, 
validate, and disseminate information to the market. These activities result in improvements in corporate 
transparency and in information environment (Bushman et al., 2004). Hence, we anticipate that investors 
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are more likely to perceive the combination of non-GAAP figures with high impression management as a 
strategic disclosure tactic in sophisticated markets. If investors discount managers’ non-GAAP 
adjustments with high impression management, then we expect the discount to be stronger in countries 
with a higher presence of sophisticated market participants. We expect a similar effect in a setting where 
enforcement of investor protection against self-dealing by the controlling shareholder is stronger. Both a 
desirable regulation and an efficient enforcement mechanism seem to be necessary for the development 
of capital markets and for the improvement in managers’ reporting practices (Holthausen, 2009). 
Following these arguments, we state our second hypothesis as follows:   
HYPOTHESIS 2: If investors react to the combination of non-GAAP disclosures and high 
impression management in earnings announcements negatively, this reaction is more negative in 
countries with more sophisticated users and stronger enforcement. 
 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND HAND-COLLECTION OF DATA 
 Our initial sample comprises all industrial firms included in the Financial Times 2006 
classification of the 500 largest European companies. This sample allows us to study a group of firms 
representing a considerable portion of European capital markets, and to investigate the effects of cross-
country variation in market conditions in a setting where the effects of managers’ disclosure practices can 
have a great impact. 
Our main source of data is the earnings announcement press releases obtained from the 
companies’ websites and through Factiva. We analyze only those that are written in English, eliminating 
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possible problems of incorrect translation.6 After eliminating observations for which we are unable to find 
press releases, our potential sample consists of 2,212 firm-year observations, covering fiscal years 2003 
to 2009. We then exclude 436 press releases (20%) that do not include non-GAAP measures. We code 
non-GAAP measures and impression management techniques related to these measures, when they are 
located in the first two sections of the press release. These sections are considered the most prominent 
locations where managers are likely to create a “first positive impression” by emphasizing good news 
(Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2013). The focus on these sections leads to the elimination 
of 170 observations which disclose non-GAAP measures, but not in the prominent sections of the press 
release.7 We obtain data on financial items and market returns from Thomson Reuters Datastream and 
data on analysts’ forecasts from I/B/E/S. Country-level factors are from published sources. After 
eliminating observations with missing values and observations from countries with less than ten firm-
years, we end up with 845 observations corresponding to 243 firms (Table 1).  
Non-GAAP earnings measures 
We hand-collect and code the type and the value of non-GAAP measures included in annual 
earnings announcement press releases. We compare non-GAAP earnings with GAAP earnings reported in 
the financial statements to calculate the value of the adjustments made by managers. Based on the 
categories of non-GAAP measures identified in earlier literature, we code the following non-GAAP 
                                                 
6
 In the cases where firms disclosed two versions of the press release, one in English and one in the company’s local-language, 
we analyzed the English version. However, given that these are the largest European companies that operate internationally, 
we believe the companies would make sure that their foreign investors would have an accurate press release. Thus, we do not 
expect that differences between the local language and English impact in our results. To ensure that language issues do not 
change our results we repeat the analysis for the UK firms only. Our conclusions do not change. 
7
 Because this sample selection choice can tilt our sample towards firms that are more aggressive in their disclosure strategies, 
we repeat our tests including the 170 observations and assuming that impression management is zero (i.e. adding non-
aggressive firms). Our results do not change. 
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earnings measures: (i) non-GAAP earnings per share, (ii) non-GAAP from continuing operations per 
share, (iii) non-GAAP net income, (iv) non-GAAP income from continuing operations, and (v) adjusted 
versions of EBITDA and EBIT. We do not collect non-GAAP cash measures, adjusted values for sales, or 
ratios.  
We exclude non-GAAP financial measures with ambiguous labels and non-GAAP measures that 
are commonly used by the accounting and finance community (such as EBITDA and EBIT) because they 
can be viewed by capital market participants as GAAP measures. Unlike the situation in the US, in some 
European countries national accounting standards establish a defined format for the income statement, 
which includes subtotals as EBITDA and EBIT. That practice continued even after the introduction of 
IFRS. The measures studied in this paper are usually labeled in the press releases as “adjusted net 
income”, “net income excluding…”, and “adjusted earnings per share”. 
 Measuring impression management 
We perform a manual content analysis to obtain a score for impression management related to the 
non-GAAP figures. Although potentially subjective, manual content analysis offers great flexibility to 
collect in detail a diverse range of practices that cannot be captured by computer-aid techniques (Li, 
2010; Linderman, 2001). For example, it is not possible to code performance comparisons using machine-
based methods. Most textual analysis papers using machine-based methods focus mainly on generic 
features of narrative disclosures such as length, tone, or readability. Furthermore, research using 
computer-aided methods to investigate the tone of the announcement rely on pre-specified wordlists, 
which does not consider the fact that managers are likely to use a combined range of disclosure practices 
to impress users (Davis et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2011).  
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To code the impression management in each earnings announcement we follow the schema 
developed by Brennan et al. (2009) and empirically tested by Garcia Osma and Guillamon-Saorin (2011). 
We analyze the three impression management disclosure techniques described below.8  
(1) Tone consists of using positive language, keywords, statements, or numerical amounts to create a 
positive image of corporate results that would not be achieved using more neutral statements. Our 
analysis of tone is based on qualitative and quantitative information related to non-GAAP figures. We 
categorize keywords as positive or negative based on a list of keywords (Abrahamson and Amir, 
1996; Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003) customized to include other 
keywords that appear in the press releases. For example, in “2003 net income adjusted for special 
items shows strong increase: +17% to 7.34 billion for results in euro” (Total, press release 2003), 
“increase” is coded as a positive keyword related to a non-GAAP figure. We further classify all non-
GAAP amounts included in the most- and next-most emphasized sections of earnings press releases as 
positive (negative) if current year amount is higher (lower) than previous year or if it is explicitly 
stated as positive or negative. In Total’s press release, income adjusted for special items is explicitly 
stated as positive and therefore coded as positive non-GAAP amount.  
(2) Emphasis consists of making a particular piece of information more obvious to the reader by using 
three strategies: (a) placing the information strategically in the press release (emphasis by location), 
(b) repeating the same piece of information in the press release (emphasis by repetition), and (c) 
reinforcing keywords by adding a qualifier to emphasize their connotation (emphasis by 
                                                 
8
 One of the measures of impression managements in prior literature is selectivity which is based on the selection of figures 
from the financial statements to be included in the narratives of corporate disclosures such as earnings announcement press 
releases (Brennan et al. 2009). We do not consider selectivity as non-GAAP measures are not part of financial statements. 
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reinforcement).9 In Total’s 2003 press release, for example, the net income adjusted for special items 
is located in the highlights and repeated again in the main text. This practice is coded as a repetition of 
a positive non-GAAP amount.10 Moreover, the word “strong” is coded as a positive reinforcement 
because it enhances the positive connotation of the positive keyword “increase”. 
(3) Performance comparisons relates to managers’ decisions to include a benchmark to compare with 
current year figures depending on the firm performance. Firms may also choose a benchmark 
strategically to show positive rather than negative changes. In Total’s 2003 press release the 
percentage “17%” is considered and coded as a reinforcement of the current year non-GAAP amount 
(7.34 billion).   
 Based on the three impression management practices described here, we calculate an impression 
management score (NGIM). Figure 1 explains the methods followed to code and analyze the impression 
management techniques, using the 2006 press release of Yell Group as an example. For the qualitative 
information related to non-GAAP figures, we give each keyword a weight of 1. If the keyword appears in 
the most-emphasized section, we add a weigh of 1; for the next-most emphasized section, we add a 
weight of 0.5. If the keyword is reinforced, we add a weight of 0.5. If the statement is repeated, we add a 
weight of 0.5. Similarly, for the quantitative information, we give a weight of 1.0 to each non-GAAP 
quantitative amount identified in the press release. If the quantitative amount appears in the most-
emphasized section, we add a weight of 1; for the next-most emphasized section we add a weight of 0.5. 
                                                 
9
 Thus, while previous non-GAAP studies focused on relative emphasis (location of non-GAAP measure versus the location of 
the GAAP figures), we measure the level of emphasis, focusing only on the location of the non-GAAP measure. This approach 
is consistent with the coding of the other measures included in our score.  
10
 Although it is common that information included in the headline is also included in the main body of the press release, we 
consider this practice as emphasis by repetition because it is up to the manager to (1) provide the press release with a headline 
(2) to include the same piece of information in the headline and in the main body of the press release. 
16 
 
If the quantitative amount is accompanied by a performance comparison, we add a weight of 0.5. If the 
quantitative amount is repeated, we add a weight of 0.5. These weights are either positive or negative 
depending on the keyword or amount positive or negative connotation. The final impression management 
score is calculated as the total composite score for all positive keywords and amounts minus the total 
composite score for all negative keywords and amounts, divided by the total number of words in the 
sections analyzed, as in earlier literature (Tetlock et al., 2008). This scaling allows for comparisons 
between press release sections of different lengths (Rogers et al., 2011). Figure 2 illustrates the 
calculation of the score. 
 
IV.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
We argue that managers may attempt to hide the persistence of non-GAAP adjustments by 
associating the disclosure of these figures to impression management techniques. In order to assess 
whether this association exists we test the persistence of the non-GAAP adjustments disclosed with a high 
level of impression management. We estimate a model similar to that used by Frankel et al. (2011) and 
Jennings and Marques (2011), as follows:   
EPSi,t+1 = 0 + 1NG_EPSi,t + 2NG_adjustmenti,t + 3High_NGIMi,t   + 
                4High_NGIM x NG_EPSi,t + 5High_NGIM x NG_adjustmenti ,t +  
               FirmControlsi,t + TimeControlsi,t  + IndControlsi,t  + CountryControlsi,t  + i,t                      (1) 
 
The dependent variable is GAAP earnings per share (EPS) for period t+1. We also estimate the 
model using operating income per share at t+1. Using operating income removes a potential mechanical 
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relation between EPSt+1 and NG_adjustment resulting from recurring adjustments such as depreciation or 
amortization (Frankel et al., 2011).  
In classic persistence models, the independent variable of interest would be GAAP EPS for period 
t. Since we are interested in analyzing the persistence of non-GAAP adjustments, and GAAP EPS is 
equal to non-GAAP EPS (NG_EPS) minus the non-GAAP adjustments on a per share basis 
(NG_adjustment), we use these two variables instead. If the non-GAAP adjustments are transitory items 
they should not be persistent and the estimated coefficient for NG_adjustment should not be statistically 
different from zero. However, given Frankel et al.’s (2011) and Jennings and Marques’ (2011) results, we 
anticipate that at least some of the adjustments are recurring items. We expect to find a negative 
coefficient on NG_adjustment, because these exclusions are almost always expenses. The main variable 
of interest is the interaction term High_NGIM x NG_adjustment. High_NGIM is an indicator variable 
coded as one when the firm’s impression management score for non-GAAP disclosure is higher than the 
sample median score, and zero otherwise. A significantly negative coefficient indicates that the 
adjustments made by managers who use a high level of impression management are more persistent (i.e., 
they are of lower quality), consistent with our prediction.  
We include the following firm-level controls. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Growth is a 
common factor of three variables: book-to-market assets, average sales growth in the last three years, and 
capital expenditures to total assets. Loss is an indicator variable coded as one if the value of GAAP 
earnings is negative, and zero otherwise. ROA Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of ROA 
(return on assets) over the previous three years. We also include year, industry (based on one-digit SIC 
codes), and country indicators. All variables are for firm i and year t. 
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Our first hypothesis assesses whether market participants react differently to the disclosure of non-
GAAP earnings that are communicated with high impression management. We use the following model 
to test it: 
CAR = 0 + 1GAAP_surprisei,t + 2NG_adjustmenti,t + 3High_NGIMi,t 
            + 4 High_NGIM  x NG_adjustmenti,t +  IndustryControlsi,t   
            + CountryControlsi,t  + i,t                                                                                                                               (2) 
 
 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for a three-day window centered on the date of the 
earnings announcement press release (k). CAR is calculated as k=-1,+1(1+ARk)-1, where AR is the 
abnormal return obtained from the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French, 1993) estimated 
over the previous 365 days and ending on day k-2. Given the international nature of the sample, we use 
country-specific risk factors, specifically market premium, size, and book-to-market international risk 
factors obtained from Ferreira et al. (2012, 2013). The definition of variables GAAP_surprise and 
NG_adjustment is based on Marques’ (2006) methodology but takes into consideration the measurement 
issues discussed by Cohen et al. (2007) and Bradshaw et al. (2014). Given that I/B/E/S provides GAAP 
forecasts as well as non-GAAP forecasts, these two measures are used to calculate GAAP surprise and 
non-GAAP surprise, respectively.11 We split the total earnings surprise of non-GAAP earnings measures 
(i.e., the difference between non-GAAP earnings and the median consensus non-GAAP earnings forecast) 
into two components. The first component is GAAP_surprise, and it is calculated as the difference 
                                                 
11
 Marques (2006) considers I/B/E/S consensus forecasts as the benchmark to compute GAAP surprise because no other 
analysts’ forecast data was available at that time. Cohen et al. (2007) points out that this practice introduces measurement 
error. Now that there are two sets of I/B/E/S forecasts available (GAAP and non-GAAP) this practice is no longer necessary. 
Bradshaw et al.’s (2014) findings indicate that after correcting for measurement error non-GAAP earnings are still more 
informative to investors than GAAP earnings.  
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between GAAP earnings per share and the median consensus GAAP earnings forecast, scaled by share 
price at the end of the previous year. The second component is NG_adjustment, representing the 
adjustments made by managers to obtain non-GAAP earnings. It is calculated as the difference between 
non-GAAP and GAAP earnings per share, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year.12 If non-
GAAP earnings are more valuable to financial markets than GAAP earnings, the estimated coefficient for 
NG_adjustment (2) should be positive. We expect a positive coefficient for High_NGIM (3) as prior 
literature provides evidence that the tone of corporate narratives influences the market valuations 
positively (Davis et al., 2012). 
Our focus is on the coefficient of the interaction between High_NGIM and NG_adjustment (4). If 
market participants do not understand managers’ attempts to promote their overstated versions of 
earnings through the use of a high level of impression management, then the coefficient 4 should be 
positive. However, if investors interpret earnings announcements containing non-GAAP information 
combined with high impression management as an attempt to camouflage the recurring nature of non-
GAAP adjustments, there are two possible scenarios: either they ignore it or they react negatively.  
Hypothesis 2 states that if investors react to the combination of non-GAAP disclosures and high 
impression management negatively, this reaction is more negative in countries with more sophisticated 
users and stronger enforcement. To test this proposition, we extend model (2) as follows: 
 
                                                 
12
 We note that the variable NG_adjustment is unscaled in equation (1), whereas in equations (2) and (3) it is scaled by share 
price. 
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CAR = 0 + 1GAAP_surprisei,t + 2NG_adjustmenti,t + 3High_NGIMi,t  
+ 4 High_NGIM x NG_adjustmenti,t + 5 High_Country 
 + 6 NG_adjustmenti,t x High_Country + 7 High_NGIM x High_Country  
+ 8 High_NGIM x NG_adjustmenti,t x High_Country  
+  IndControls
 i,t  + i,t                                                                                                                           
(3) 
 
We use two measures to assess the level of sophistication of capital markets. The first is the 
percentage of institutional investment to market capitalization in the country, from Ferreira and Matos 
(2008). The second is the number of analysts in a country as reported in Bae et al. (2008). We assess the 
strength of investor protection with the anti self-dealing index created by Djankov et al. (2008). To 
facilitate the interpretation of results for each of the country measure, we create indicator variables coded 
as one if the country’s value, for each variable, is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. These 
are mentioned as High_Country in equation (3). The main focus of model (3) is the coefficient of the 
three-way interaction term High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x High_Country (8). Consistent with 
hypothesis 2, we expect 8 to be significantly negative. The definitions of the remaining variables and 
expected coefficients are as discussed previously for model (2).  
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and univariate tests  
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by country. The mean non-GAAP impression management 
score (NGIM) is positive for all countries, indicating an overall positive impression in the sample press 
releases. We find the highest NGIM score in Ireland (0.060) and the lowest in Hungary (0.001). A score 
of 0.060 means that in every 100 words analyzed there are six points more of positively biased content 
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than negative biased content. Hungary’s score indicates a more neutral content. The mean values of the 
adjustments (both unscaled and scaled by market price) vary substantially, suggesting the existence of 
country-level effects. The mean of the country-level variables also vary substantially, which encourages 
our belief that differences in institutional and economic conditions are likely to result in differences in the 
market reaction to non-GAAP disclosures.  
 Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables included in our models. 
The mean GAAP_surprise is -0.017, indicating that on average GAAP earnings misses analysts’ GAAP 
forecasts by approximately 0.2 cents (per each Euro of its price). On average, non-GAAP earnings are 
higher than GAAP earnings as the mean NG_adjustment is 0.035. The positive mean is consistent with 
prior evidence and results from managers’ excluding mostly expenses. Panel B of Table 3 presents 
Pearson correlations and their level of significance. Correlations are generally low. The NGIM score is 
positively correlated with CAR and NG_adjustment. 
 Table 4 presents univariate tests of the association between impression management and several 
aggressive non-GAAP disclosure practices. Black and Christensen (2009) find that managers 
intentionally exclude recurring items, such as R&D, depreciation and amortization, stock-based 
compensation, and tax items. The univariate results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that the level of the 
NGIM score is higher when firms make adjustments for recurring items. This evidence is consistent with 
a strategic use of non-GAAP disclosures and impression management techniques. We also find that firms 
that disclose non-GAAP figures with higher emphasis than GAAP figures tend to have a significantly 
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higher impression management score (Panel B).13 Moreover, we observe that firms than beat analysts’ 
forecasts only on a non-GAAP basis (i.e., when GAAP earnings miss the benchmarks) disclose non-
GAAP measures with higher impression management (Panel C).   
Figure 3 presents a temporal analysis of the recurring adjustments and the impression management 
score. The figure shows that both variables follow a similar time pattern. This finding suggests the 
possibility of a strategic use of the non-GAAP disclosures and impression management techniques.  A 
caveat of this analysis is that we can only observe exclusions for a limited number of cases (409 firm-
years), because many firms do not disclose the nature of the adjustments. The lack of information is a 
direct consequence of the absence of strict non-GAAP disclosure rules in Europe.14  
Results for the persistence analysis   
Table 5 reports estimation results for two versions of model (1). As expected, the coefficients of 
NG_EPS are positive and statistically significant, which is an indication that future earnings are 
associated with current earnings. Consistent with our expectations and prior evidence, we find that some 
of the managers’ adjustments are persistent. The estimated coefficients of NG_adjustment are negative 
(values are -0.476 and -0.703) and statistically significant. The estimated coefficients for the interaction 
variable High_NGIM x NG_adjustment are negative and significant. In other words, the non-GAAP 
adjustments made by the High_NGIM group are more recurring (i.e., of lower quality). This recurrence of 
                                                 
13
 We caution that our impression management score includes measures of emphasis and thus it is not surprising that 
impression management and the emphasis of non-GAAP earnings are positively related.  
14
 Given the small number of observations and relative short time-series, we cannot rule out that the association between non-
GAAP recurring exclusions and impression management could be a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis. 
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the adjustments combined with high impression management is consistent with our argument that 
managers use communication strategically in an attempt to mask the persistence of the adjustments, and 
portray non-GAAP earnings as a better measure of recurring performance than GAAP earnings.    
Results for the market reaction (H1) 
We test whether investors react to non-GAAP disclosures combined with high impression 
management. Table 6, Column (1) presents the results for a base model that includes only the 
GAAP_surprise and the constant term. The estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that the market interprets the announcement of GAAP results above analysts’ expectations as 
good news. In column (2) we add NG_adjustment to the model to examine whether the market perceives 
alternative earnings numbers to be relevant information, in addition to that conveyed by GAAP. This 
effect has been established in US markets, but to the best of our knowledge, has never been tested 
internationally. The positive and statistically significant coefficient (coefficient = 0.061, t-statistic = 2.44) 
is consistent with the notion that non-GAAP information has incremental information content and 
previous results. This result can be interpreted as the investors’ perception that the non-GAAP 
adjustments lead to a higher earnings surprise than that indicated by the GAAP figure. In column (3) we 
test whether there is a market reaction for a high level of impression management and find markets react 
positively to this.  
Column (4) of Table 6 presents the results of estimating model (2). The coefficient of interest, 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment, is negative (-0.130) and statistically significant (t-statistic = -5.78), 
indicating a lower market reaction to non-GAAP adjustments when the disclosure of the non-GAAP is 
accompanied by a high level of impression management. The abnormal return for the non-GAAP 
adjustments, when the disclosure of non-GAAP is accompanied by a low or moderate level of impression 
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management is 0.125, whereas the reaction to the adjustments, when the non-GAAP disclosure is 
accompanied by high impression management is economically and statistically zero (0.125 – 0.130). This 
empirical evidence suggests investors ignore non-GAAP information when managers communicate that 
information aggressively. Given our persistence results, one possible explanation is that investors 
perceive the aggressive communication style as an attempt to inflate the firm’s operating profitability and 
penalize firms for it. This result differs from previous findings for US markets, where unsophisticated 
investors are misled by aggressive non-GAAP disclosures. We provide three alternative explanations for 
this discrepancy: (i) there are more sophisticated investors in the European capital markets than in the US, 
(ii) non-GAAP disclosures are more common in Europe than in the US, and (iii) there has been a learning 
effect through time, as discussion on non-GAAP has increased recently. Some data on the three possible 
explanations follows.  
First, sophisticated users dominate the European capital markets. A report on the share ownership 
structure of listed European companies, submitted to the European Commission and the Financial 
Services User Group, indicates that the weight of households’ ownership went from 28% (in 1975) to just 
11% (in 2012) and that individuals now held equity mostly through retail investment funds and 
“packaged products” offered by financial distributors.15  
Second, our data indicates that that non-GAAP reporting is a common European practice (80% of 
our sample reports a non-GAAP figure in their press releases). In most cases (89%) non-GAAP figures 
have the same or higher emphasis than GAAP numbers, and in 74% of the cases European firms report 
                                                 
15
 http://ec.europa.eu/finance/finservices-retail/docs/fsug/papers/1308-report-who-owns-european-economy_en.pdf 
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some type of reconciliation to GAAP measures. Thus, investors are familiar with non-GAAP information 
of European firms. In untabulated tests we include in our main model an indicator variable for the 
presence of a tabular reconciliation (Reconc).  The estimated coefficient for High_NGIM x 
NG_adjustment is still negative and statistically significant, and the coefficient of a three-way interaction 
between this variable and Reconc is also negative and statistically significant. This result is consistent 
with reconciliations helping investors to understand whether the adjustments are recurring.  
Third, it is possible that through time managers learn about the negative reaction to exaggerated 
impression management. The mean of the NGIM score is 0.04 during the period 2004 to 2007, but 
decreases significantly to 0.02 in 2008 and is almost zero in 2009. Interestingly the number of aggressive 
recurring exclusions follows a similar pattern (see figure 3). It is possible that managers reduced 
impression management due to an increasing negative investor response to that practice. To shed light on 
this question we repeat our analysis adding a time trend variable (TREND) to the model. We find a 
negative and significant coefficient for High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x TREND, which confirms that the 
reaction to the combination of high impression management and non-GAAP numbers has increased 
through time. It is also possible that managers have reduced aggressive non-GAAP communication in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, as one of the consequences of the crisis was the increased public pressure 
for more transparent corporate reporting, but our time series is not sufficiently long to draw conclusive 
statements. 
The remaining coefficients in column (4) are in line with the results in the previous estimations. 
The positive estimated coefficient for High_NGIM (0.046) is consistent with prior evidence of a general 
positive market reaction to the use of communication techniques to convey earnings information.  
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One could wonder whether the effect observed for non-GAAP impression management is a spill-
over effect of general impression management. To test this possibility, we add to the model a measure of 
impression management that captures the impression management used on the remaining information. 
We create an indicator variable, High_OtherIM, coded as one when the impression management in the 
text unrelated to non-GAAP disclosures is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. We then interact 
the indicator variable with GAAP_suprise, and include it in the model. The estimated coefficient for 
High_NGIM and its interaction with NG_adjustment remains significant, indicating that there is an effect 
for general impression management that is different from the effect observed for non-GAAP disclosures. 
To test whether our results are driven by one or more impression management tools, we test the 
individual components of our impression management score: tone, emphasis, and performance 
comparisons. Panel B of Table 6 indicates that all components are relevant.  
We conduct several additional tests. We first investigate the market reaction to non-GAAP 
adjustments and impression management in periods after the earnings announcement. Specifically, we 
estimate the model for windows [+2,+30], [+2,+60] and [+2,+90]. For the 30-day period we find a similar 
negative investor response, and similar coefficients for the other variables. Thus, it is possible that 
investors do not fully unravel managers’ motives, and that NGIM dampens the negative price response 
that occurs in the short window. However, we find no evidence of a reaction in the subsequent 60-day or 
90-day period. Second, in order to take into consideration that the expected value of adjustments may be 
different from zero, we run a model with a structure similar to column (4) of Table 6, but where we 
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substitute NG_adjustment by NG_adjustment_surprise.16 Results are consistent with the ones discussed in 
Table 6. Third, to account for the influence of country specific variation in impression management (that 
may result from cultural and language differences) we repeat the analysis using a country demeaned 
NGIM variable. The results are similar to those reported in Table 6. We also repeat the tests excluding the 
UK and France to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by firms in these two countries, which 
account for about half of our total sample. Our conclusions do not change, although the empirical results 
are slightly weaker (due to the small sample size). Fourth, we repeat the analysis including in the model 
time indicators or a time trend variable and obtain similar results. Finally, we test the impact of IFRS 
adoption and find no evidence of an IFRS effect. 
Results of country-level effects (H2) 
Hypothesis 2 states that if investors react negatively to the combination of non-GAAP disclosures 
and impression management this penalty is stronger in countries with more sophisticated markets, and 
with stronger enforcement. To test it we interact High_NGIM x NG_adjustment with the indicator 
variable High_Country, which is coded as one when the country has score above the sample median in 
each of the three country factors (percentage of institutional investors, number of financial analysts, and 
private enforcement of anti self-dealing), and zero otherwise. Table 7 presents the results. The negative 
and statistically significant coefficients on High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x High_Country indicate that 
the market reaction to non-GAAP adjustments that are accompanied by high impression management is 
                                                 
16
 We define NG_adjustment_surprise as Non-GAAP surprise – GAAP surprise, where Non-GAAP Surprise = 
Actual Non-GAAP Earnings – Forecasted Non-GAAP Earnings.  
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lower for firms from countries with a higher presence of institutional investors and analysts, and with 
strong enforcement of minority investors’ rights. The total market reaction to the adjustments made in 
such settings is the sum of the coefficients of the variables NG_adjustment, High_NGIM x 
NG_adjustment, NG_adjustment x High_country and the three-way interaction. Ignoring the one 
coefficient that is not statistically significant we get the following totals: -0.119 for column (1), -0.278 for 
column (2), and -0.218 for column (3). These values are statistically negative. Moreover, our results 
indicate that the investors in less-sophisticated markets ignore non-GAAP adjustments made with high 
impression management, as the sum of the two coefficients of interest (NG_adjustment, and High_NGIM 
x NG_adjustment) is statistically zero. Taken together, our results suggest that while the investors in more 
sophisticated markets penalize the adjustments communicated with high impression management (maybe 
understanding the persistence of the adjustments made), the investors in less-sophisticated markets do not 
react to these adjustments (maybe seeing them as cheap talk). 
We next combine the three country variables using principal component analysis and extract two 
factors: SOPH (high loadings for variables percentage of institutional investors and number of analysts), 
and PROT (high loading for investor protection). Untabulated results indicate that the estimated 
coefficients for High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x High_SOPH and High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x 
High_PROT are negative, but only the first one is statistically significant. Overall, our results are 
consistent with H2 and can be interpreted as evidence that investors in developed markets penalize more 
the firms that strategically use communication techniques to diminish the transparency of non-GAAP 
disclosures.  
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VI.  ADDITIONAL ANALYSES  
Self-selection: the decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings 
Our main analyses are based on cases that disclose non-GAAP earnings measures in the same 
section in which we measure impression management. This requirement ensures that the impression 
management score is directly related to non-GAAP reporting, but creates potential selection problems. 
These problems arise because we analyze only firms that choose to disclose non-GAAP information, and 
that choice is likely to be a result of specific conditions rather than a random choice. To address this 
concern we estimate a two-step selection model (Heckman, 1979). Similar to Christensen et al. (2014), 
we follow Tucker (2007) and allow the disclosing (NGdisclose) and non-disclosing groups to have 
different coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio (Mill) in the second step of the estimation.  
The selection equation models the decision to disclose a non-GAAP figure in the earnings 
announcements, considering determinants previously identified in the literature (e.g. Walker and Louvari, 
2003; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Marques, 2006) and our  three alternative measures of sophisticated 
markets, due to the results of Isidro and Marques (2015). The selection results in Table 8 are consistent 
with our previous results, as the two sets of the three coefficients estimated for the interaction terms of 
interest, High_NGIM x NG_adjustment and its interactions with the country-level variables, are negative 
and statistically significant in all cases. Furthermore, the two sets of three coefficients estimated for the 
inverse Mills ratio are negative and statistically significant, indicating that there is a self-selection effect 
in our sample and the unobserved factors are negatively associated with CAR.  
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Choice of impression management level 
Considering that the level of impression management used is chosen by the firm, we next assess 
whether managers are being strategic in their disclosure decisions. We follow the method proposed by 
Hogan (1997) to model auditor choice in initial public offerings to construct counterfactual results for 
firms choosing high and low impression management. We start by estimating the determinants of 
communicating non-GAAP numbers using high impression management, in order to obtain the inverse 
Mills ratios for high and for low impression management firms.  
As determinants of high non-GAAP impression management we use firm characteristics 
associated with aggressive communication (Garcia Osma and Guillamon-Saorin, 2011; Black et al., 
2016), as follows. Past accruals management is an indicator variable coded as one when the firm's net 
operating assets are above the industry year median, and zero otherwise. Real earnings management 
(REM) is calculated as the sum of two measures of real earnings management (abnormal cash from 
operations, and abnormal production of inventory). Accrual earnings management (AEM) is defined as 
the abnormal accruals from the performance-adjusted modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 
1995; Kothari et al., 2005). Good news indicates if the firm reports an increase in earnings. Unmanaged 
earnings are calculated as I/B/E/S actual EPS minus REM and AEM. Past_NGIM is an indicator variable 
coded as one when the firm reported high NGIM in the previous year, and zero otherwise. Leverage is 
computed as debt to total assets. Size is measured as the natural log of total assets. Institutional holdings 
are measured by the percentage of institutional holdings in the firm. 
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We next use the estimated results to compute predicted values of CAR for the two subsamples. 
The predicted CARs indicate investor reaction if a high (low) NGIM firm had opted to use low (high) 
NGIM practices. Finally, we compare the mean predicted CARs with the actual CARs. The difference in 
means indicates the effect of firms’ strategic choice. For high NGIM firms the market reaction (actual 
CAR = 0.075) is significantly stronger than the reaction they would have achieved if they selected the 
low impression management style (predicted CAR = 0.034). This difference suggests a strategic choice of 
impression management. The same conclusion is obtained for low NGIM firms, as they avoid the 
negative market reaction that they would have experienced if they had engaged in high impression 
management (actual CAR is 0.032 and predicted CAR is -0.05, and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level).  
Alternative measures of impression management 
To test the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of impression management we first 
repeat the analysis using an industry adjusted measure of impression management. The second approach 
is to calculate an abnormal measure of impression management similar to that proposed by Huang et al. 
(2013). The abnormal impression management is the residual of a regression of high non-GAAP 
impression management on firm characteristics described in the section above. Finally, we change the 
weighting scheme of the impression management score, as weights can be subjective (Beattie et al., 
2004). We repeat our empirical tests using an unweighted impression management score. We also use 
weights that are twice those initially assigned to tone for emphasis and performance comparisons. The 
idea is that these characteristics are likely to enhance more the positiveness or negativeness of 
information than tone. Our conclusions remain qualitatively the same.  
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Machine-based measures 
The manual content analysis applied in this study allows us to obtain a measure of impression 
management that is specifically tailored for non-GAAP disclosures, and covers several communication 
techniques. However, manual content analysis can introduce subjectivity in the analysis. To test the 
robustness of our results we construct three machine-based measures of language tone. We focus only 
on tone because commonly used machine-based methods are developed to capture tone. The three 
measures of language tone are based on: (i) the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary, (ii) the 
Harvard dictionary (Loughran and McDonald, 2011, 2015), and (iii) the list of words derived from our 
manual content analysis.17  
The market reaction results for the machine-coded scores are similar to those presented in tables 6 
and 7, but slightly weaker. For example, the coefficients and correspondent t-statistics for the interaction 
term in equation 2 (High
_
Tone x NG_adjustment) are -0.094 (t-stat = -1.45) in the case of Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) score, -0.092 (t-stat=-1.73) for the Harvard dictionary score, and -0.093 (t-stat=-1.82) 
for the score based on our own wordlist. We believe the weaker results are a consequence of two factors. 
First, the machine-coded score captures only tone and ignores other communication techniques which are 
captured by our main score. Second, the lists are not developed with announcements of financial data in 
                                                 
17
 The Loughran and McDonald (2011) list is available at http://www.nd.edu/mcdonald/Word Lists.html. The Harvard 
Psychosociological Dictionary, is available through the GI website (see http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/inquirer/). The list 
derived from the manual content analysis of the press releases included in this study is available upon request. The Loughran 
and McDonald (2011) list and the Harvard list are chosen because they have been widely used in accounting and finance 
research. However, they have also been criticised. First, the Harvard list is developed for psychological research and includes 
words which are not common in a finance context (e.g. mine or cancer) and it has been argued that it misclassifies words in 
financial applications (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Second, the Loughran and McDonald (2011) list is developed for 
corporate 10K but it is biased towards a negative content (the list includes 354 positive words and 2,329 negative words). 
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mind. Overall, we conclude that computer-based methods of content analysis may not work as well as 
manual analysis for studying specific aspects of corporate disclosures.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Managers use the flexibility allowed by earnings announcement press releases to disclose non-
GAAP earnings measures that exclude transitory components, and are potentially a better presentation of 
permanent earnings. But the discretionary nature of non-GAAP calculations also creates opportunities to 
mislead investors. This possibility is intensified in environments where there are no stringent rules on 
non-GAAP reporting, investor protection is weaker, and investors’ sophistication is low. In addition, the 
flexibility allowed by earnings announcement press releases offers managers the opportunity to use 
communication techniques (i.e. impression management) to persuade investors and other users that their 
non-GAAP disclosures are a good representation of the firm’s persistent profitability.  
For a sample of large European firms, we find that managers exclude recurring items from non-
GAAP earnings, and that they combine this practice with high impression management. Investors react 
positively to non-GAAP information disclosed with low levels of impression management, but ignore the 
non-GAAP values that are combined with high impression management. Our evidence suggests that the 
market correctly identifies high impression management as an attempt to positively bias their perception 
about the persistence of non-GAAP earnings. Finally, we consider country-level conditions such as users’ 
sophistication and protection of investors’ rights. Our results indicate that in countries with sophisticated 
users and strong investor protection there is a penalty for disclosing non-GAAP figures with a high level 
of impression management.  
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Measuring Impression Management 
 
Yell Group plc- Final Results   
8097 words 
23 May 2006 
07:01 
Regulatory News Service 
English 
(c) 2006 All Rights Reserved.  
RSN Number: 3958D Yell Group plc 23 May 2006 
Yell Group plc financial results for the year ended 31 March 2006 
 
 
 
Strong growth across all business. Successful integration of TransWestern 
Most 
emphasized 
section 
 
-- Group revenue up 26.1% to £1,621.3 million 
-- Group adjusted EBITDA up Keyword+ 28.0% Bench+ to  £502.9 NUM+ NG million 
-- Adjusted profit after tax up Keyword+ 26.1%  Bench+ to £233.6 NUM+ NG million 
-- Group operating cash conversion of 88.9% compared to 88.4% last year 
--Adjusted diluted earnings per share up Keyword+ 25.2% Bench+ to 32.8 NUM+ NG pence 
-- Proposed final dividend up 21.4% to 10.2 pence per share 
Next most 
emphasised 
section 
 
Statutory results (unaudited)  
                                                                                  2005              2006             Change 
Revenue                                                                 1,285.3           1,621.3            26.1% 
Operating profit                                                        327.7              449.9             37.3% 
Profit after tax                                                          162.5               212.3            30.6% 
Cash generated from operations                              357.8               411.5            15.0% 
Diluted earnings per share (pence)                            22.9                29.7              29.7% 
 
Least 
emphasised 
section 
Key: NUM+/-=positive/negative amount, Bench+/-= positive/negative performance comparisons, 
Keyword+/-=positive/negative keyword 
NG= Non-GAAP figure 
 
 
We illustrate impression management practices using a specific press release of a company included in our sample: Yell Group 
plc, year of 2006. We perform manual content analysis, which allows a detailed scrutiny of the press release. We manually 
code the three impression management practices investigated in the current study. Each press release is assigned three levels of 
emphasis (most-, next-most and least- emphasized sections) and the qualitative and quantitative information is coded for each 
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section separately. For the purposes of this study we focus on the first two sections of the press release (most- and next-most 
emphasized sections). 
The impression management score is calculated following the method included in Figure 1, and the calculation is in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 1: Method to measure impression management (management positiveness/negativeness) 
 
Technique Object of technique Measure 
(1) Tone Keywords 
 
Quantitative amounts 
Number of positive and negative keywords 
Number of quantitative positive and 
negative amounts 
(2) Emphasis (a)Location/positioning/presentation of 
keywords 
Location/positioning/presentation of amounts 
Most-, next-most emphasized section 
 
Most-, next-most emphasized section 
 (b) Repetition of statements 
 
Repetition of quantitative amounts 
 
(c) Reinforcement of keywords 
Number of positive and negative repetitions 
of statements 
Number of positive and negative repetitions 
of amounts 
Number of positive and negative 
reinforcements 
(3) Performance 
comparisons 
Quantitative amounts Benchmark, Previous year amount, Both 
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Figure 2: Calculating impression management score (NGIM) 
Measure Positive 
keywords
Negative 
keywords
Positive 
amounts
Negative
amounts
 Number of disclosures (Keywords and amounts) 3 0 3 0
 
 
 Impression management score (NGIM) 
Positive score Negative 
score
Positive 
score
Negative 
score
(1) Disclosure of keywords and quantitative performance monetary 
and non-monetary amounts 
3x1.0 0x1.0 3x1.0 0x1.0
(2)(a) Emphasis – Location:  
          - Most-  0 x 1.0 0 x 1.0 0 x 0.0 0 x 0.0
          - Next-most  3 x 0.5 0 x0.5 3 x 0.5 0 x 0.5
 
(2)(b) Emphasis – Repetition 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5
(2) (c) Emphasis – Reinforcement of keywords 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5
(3) Performance comparisons  0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5 3 x 0.5 0 x 0.5
 
 
Total impression management score 4.5 0.0 6.0  0.0
 
NGIM Score calculation 
10.5Positive score –0.0 Negative score = 10.5Net positive score/74 Total number of words in sections coded = + 0.1418 
 
Although in this illustration we focus on the press release of Yell Group plc for 2006, our analysis involves the study of five 
consecutive years (2003 to 2009). Yell Group has a loss of £40.6 million in 2003. In 2004 the company increases losses to 
£51.1 million, in 2005 it has a profit of £94.2 million, in 2006 profit goes up to £212.3 million. In 2007 the company has profit 
of £212.7 million and in 2008 profit decreases to £206.7 million. In 2009 profit decreased dramatically to a loss of £1,141.4 
million. Despite this overall poor performance, the press releases for all years from 2003 up to 2009 for Yell Group have a 
positive non-GAAP impression management score (NGIM) as measured in this study. This reflects an overall positive tone of 
the qualitative and quantitative information included in its press release. The IM Score for Yell Group is 0.00 for 2003, 0.061 
for 2004, 0.094 for 2005, 0.014 for 2006, 0.046 for 2007 and 2008, and 0.38 for 2009.  
The company did not include a non-GAAP amount in the sections analyzed for the 2003 press release. However, the company 
included three non-GAAP earnings figures in each of the following years from 2004 throughout 2009 in the prominent 
sections of the press releases analyzed in this study. In all cases the non-GAAP figures were positive (only one non-GAAP 
amount included in the sections analyzed of the press release for 2004 was neutral) and all included performance comparisons 
showing a positive change from earlier years. In all cases, the non-GAAP amounts were located in the second section of the 
press release, always before the GAAP earnings figures. In all cases, the non-GAAP figures included in the press release were 
larger than the GAAP figures. For example, in the press release for 2006 Yell Group included adjusted EBITDA (£502.9), 
adjusted profit after tax (£233.6), and adjusted diluted earnings per share (£32.8) - amounts are highlighted in the Appendix. 
The corresponding GAAP amounts were operating profit (£449.3), net income (£212.7), and diluted earnings per share 
(£27.09). The use of non-GAAP information and impression management is even more striking in the press release of 2009, 
where even though the company reported GAAP losses, all the non-GAAP figures in the press release were positive, and the 
NGIM score is positive. 
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Figure 3: The time series variation in non-GAAP impression management and recurring exclusions 
 
This figure illustrates the time series variation in the mean non-GAAP impression management (NGIM) and the average 
number of aggressive recurring exclusions done by managers. Variables are re-scaled to fit in the graph. Aggressive recurring 
exclusions are  R&D expenses, depreciation and amortization, stock-based compensation, and tax items Black and Christensen 
(2009). 
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TABLE 1 
Sample selection 
  Firm-years 
Financial Times top 500 European industrial companies, 
2003-2009 2,373 
Unavailable press releases -161 
2,212 
Firms without non-GAAP measures in press release -436 
1,776 
Firms with non-GAAP measures, but not in section 1 or 2 of 
the press release -170 
1,606 
Missing data on accounting, analysts, market, and country 
variables -761 
Final sample 845 
Corresponding to 243 firms   
This table shows the sample selection details. Numbers in parentheses are observations that are dropped. 
Observations from countries with less than ten firm-years were also eliminated. 
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TABLE 2 - Descriptive statistics by country 
Country N Mean 
NGIM 
score 
Mean 
NG_adjust. 
(unscaled) 
Mean 
NG_adjust. 
(scaled) 
Percentage 
institutional 
ownership 
Number 
analysts 
 
Investor 
protection 
score 
Austria 10 0.025 0.130 0.003 13.2 99 0.21 
Belgium 13 0.012 0.239 0.014 9.8 383 0.54 
Denmark 19 0.016 1.231 0.056 20.5 323 0.47 
Finland 23 0.008 0.148 0.009 33.8 331 0.46 
France 133 0.035 1.070 0.039 21.1 1,272 0.38 
Germany 61 0.031 0.259 0.012 21.0 807 0.28 
Greece 16 0.045 0.124 0.011 10.2 78 0.23 
Hungary 10 0.001 -0.159 -0.015 8.8 34 0.20 
Ireland 18 0.060 0.144 0.010 30.5 180 0.79 
Italy 33 0.011 0.150 0.015 13.6 736 0.39 
Netherlands 28 0.028 0.843 0.032 32.4 867 0.21 
Norway 17 0.015 1.326 0.191 21.1 269 0.44 
Portugal 13 0.011 -0.001 0.000 9.0 208 0.49 
Russia 14 0.013 0.381 0.002 12.4 41 0.48 
Spain 31 0.032 -0.071 -0.008 16.6 634 0.37 
Sweden 39 0.017 0.305 0.034 33.8 625 0.34 
Switzerland 48 0.033 1.021 0.058 22.9 341 0.27 
UK 319 0.039 0.332 0.043 20.1 601 0.93 
This table presents the number of observations (N), the mean impression management score accompanying non-GAAP disclosures 
(NGIM), the mean non-GAAP adjustments disclosed by managers  (unscaled and scaled by share price at the end of the previous year), 
and means of the country-level variables, all by country. NG_adjustment is the difference between non-GAAP disclosed by managers 
and GAAP earnings. 
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TABLE 3 - Descriptive statistics, for all observations  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for main variables 
  
Mean 1Q Median 3Q St.dev. 
CAR 0.068 0.016 0.071 0.127 0.087 
GAAP_surprise -0.017 -0.012 -0.001 0.004 0.514 
NG_adjustment 0.035 0.001 0.005 0.037 0.119 
NGIM score 0.031 0.000 0.026 0.054 0.051 
Size 9.174 8.339 9.143 9.983 1.194 
Book-to-Market Assets 0.349 0.211 0.321 0.465 0.213 
Capital expenditures 0.590 0.255 0.556 0.897 0.378 
Average sales growth 0.092 0.008 0.064 0.149 0.166 
Loss 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.283 
ROA volatility 0.032 0.009 0.019 0.034 0.054 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) CAR 1 
   (2) GAAP_surprise 0.086* 1 
   (3) NG_adjustment 0.025 0.033 1 
   (4) NGIM Score 0.217* 0.012 0.098* 1 
   (5) Size -0.082* -0.002 -0.089* 0.018 1 
   (6) Book-to-market assets -0.131* 0.011 0.087* -0.123* 0.237* 1 
   (7) Capital expenditures 0.042 0.019 -0.038 -0.106* 0.107* 0.129* 1 
  (8) Average sales growth 0.114* -0.003 0.044 0.102* -0.069 0.010 -0.053 1 
 (9) Loss -0.147* -0.073* 0.055 -0.145* 0.082* 0.174* -0.008 -0.005 1 
(10)ROA Volatility -0.074* -0.023 0.056 -0.101* -0.215* -0.064 -0.012 0.069 0.248* 1 
This table presents summary statistics (Panel A) and correlation coefficients (Panel B) of the main variables. The definition of variables 
is as follows. CAR is the three-day abnormal market return adjusted for country-specific market premium, size, and book-to-market. 
GAAP_surprise is the difference between GAAP earnings per share and the median consensus GAAP EPS forecast, scaled by share price 
at the end of the previous year. NG_adjustment is the difference between non-GAAP disclosed by managers and GAAP earnings, scaled 
by share price at the end of the previous year. NGIM is a score representing impression management around the disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings measures (see Appendix). Size is the logarithm of total assets. Book-to-market assets is the ratio of book value of equity to 
market value of equity plus book value of total debt. Capital expenditures is the ratio of PPE to total assets. Average sales growth is 
growth in sales over the last 3 years. Loss is an indicator variable coded as one if GAAP earnings is negative, and zero otherwise. ROA 
Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of ROA (return on assets) over the previous three years. The number of observations is 
845. The *symbol next to the Pearson correlation coefficient indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
 TABLE 4 – Impression management and aggressive non-GAAP disclosure 
 
Panel A: Exclusion of recurring items 
  NGIM score 
 
Mean Median 
No recurring adjustments 0.025 0.016 
Recurring adjustments 0.035 0.024 
Test of difference [p-value]  0.062 0.059 
 
Panel B: Non-GAAP earnings with higher emphasis 
  NGIM score 
 
Mean Median 
NG earnings have lower or same emphasis than GAAP earnings 0.029 0.024 
NG earnings have higher emphasis than GAAP earnings 0.045 0.038 
Test of difference [p-value]  0.001 <0.001 
 
Panel C: Beating analyst forecasts with non-GAAP 
  NGIM score 
 
Mean Median 
NG earnings meets/beats forecast but GAAP earnings does not 0.041 0.037 
Otherwise 0.033 0.029 
Test of difference [p-value]  0.071 0.024 
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TABLE 5 - Persistence of non-GAAP adjustments and impression management 
 
  
Future  
Earnings 
Future operating 
income 
NG_EPS 1.552*** 2.706*** 
(5.55) (5.14) 
NG_adjustment  -0.476*** -0.703*** 
(-3.68) (-2.88) 
High_NGIM -0.331 -1.455 
(-0.28) (-0.66) 
High_NGIM*NG_EPS 0.170 0.213 
(1.23) (0.81) 
High_NGIM*NG_adjustment -0.581*** -0.803*** 
(-4.50) (-3.29) 
Size 0.130 0.553 

(0.32) (0.71) 
  Growth -0.466 -0.969 

(-0.69) (-0.74) 
  Loss -3.223** -5.930** 
(-2.33) (-2.36) 
ROA volatility 0.198 0.469 

(0.57) (0.70) 
Constant 5.218** 11.276*** 

(2.15) (2.62) 
Time controls Yes Yes 
Industry controls Yes Yes 
Country controls Yes Yes 
N 845 845 
Adjusted R2 0.853 0.903 
This table presents regression results of the persistence of earnings and managers non-GAAP 
adjustments moderated by impression management. The definition of variables is as follows. 
NG_EPS is non-GAAP earnings per share. NG_Adjustment is the difference between non-GAAP 
earnings disclosed by managers and GAAP earnings. High_NGIM is an indicator variable coded 
as one if the impression management score around non-GAAP disclosures is above the sample 
median, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Growth is a common factor of 
three variables: book-to-market assets, average sales growth in last three years, and capital 
expenditures to total assets. Loss is an indicator variable coded as one if GAAP earnings is 
negative, and zero otherwise. ROA volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of ROA 
(return on assets) over the previous three years. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significant 
coefficients at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). Parameter estimates are 
reported first, followed by robust t-statistics corrected for firm-level clustering in parentheses. 
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TABLE 6 - Market reaction to non-GAAP adjustments and impression management 
Panel A: Results for the impression management score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GAAP_surprise 0.134*** 0.118** 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.119*** 
(3.00) (2.42) (3.14) (5.37) (7.35) 
NG_adjustment  0.061** 0.125** 0.110** 
(2.44) (2.97) (2.60) 
High_NGIM 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.037*** 
(5.35) (4.79) (3.82) 
High_NGIM x 
NG_adjustment -0.130*** -0.124*** 
(-5.78) (-4.49) 
High_OTHIM 0.027*** 
(4.90) 
High_OTHIM x 
GAAP_surprise 0.206 
(1.22) 
Constant 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.020 0.024*** 0.016** 
(4.50) (2.81) (1.45) (4.56) (3.32) 
N 845 845 845 845 845 
Adjusted R2 4.7% 5.8% 8.7% 8.9% 11.3% 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Results for individual components of the impression management score 
Tone Emphasis 
 
Performance 
comparisons 
  (4.a) (4.b) (4.c) 
GAAP_surprise 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 
(5.34) (5.32) (5.38) 
NG_adjustment  0.139** 0.142*** 0.117** 
(3.23) (6.36) (3.26) 
High_NGIM 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 
(4.49) (3.54) (4.44) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment -0.147*** -0.150*** -0.122*** 
(-4.91) (-4.30) (-4.18) 
Constant 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 
(5.25) (5.25) (4.55) 
N 845 845 845 
Adjusted R2 5.1% 5.1% 5.7% 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country controls Yes Yes Yes 
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This table presents regression results of the market reaction to non-GAAP disclosures moderated by 
impression management. Panel A reports results for the impression management score. Panel B reports 
results for the individual components of the score: Tone (positive and negative keywords, and quantitative 
amounts); Emphasis (location, repetition, and reinforcement); and Performance comparisons. The 
definition of variables is as follows. CAR is the three-day cumulative abnormal market return adjusted for 
country-specific market premium, size, and book to market. GAAP_surprise is the difference between 
GAAP earnings per share and the median consensus GAAP EPS forecast, scaled by share price at the end 
of the previous year. NG_adjustment is the difference between non-GAAP earnings disclosed by managers 
and GAAP earnings, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year. High_NGIM is an indicator 
variable coded as one if the impression management score around non-GAAP disclosures is above the 
sample median and zero otherwise. High_OTHIM is an indicator variable coded as one if the impression 
management around other information (i.e., not non-GAAP diclosures) is above the sample median and 
zero otherwise. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significant coefficients at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively (two-tailed). Parameter estimates are reported first, followed by robust t-statistics 
corrected for firm-level clustering in parentheses. 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 - Market reaction to non-GAAP adjustments and impression management in 
different institutional environments 
 
  
Institutional 
Investors 
Number of 
analysts 
Investor 
protection 
  (1) (2) (3) 
GAAP_surprise 0.115*** 0.138*** 0.147*** 
(6.79) (11.00) (8.24) 
NG_adjustment  0.083** 0.109* 0.182*** 
(2.14) (1.92) (3.56) 
High_NGIM 0.048*** 0.042** 0.051*** 
(3.56) (2.58) (3.03) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment -0.095*** -0.110* -0.131** 
(-3.27) (-1.74) (-2.27) 
High_country -0.008 -0.000 0.029 
(-0.52) (-0.02) (1.54) 
NG_adjustment x High_country 0.006 -0.090*** -0.213*** 
(0.10) (-4.39) (-3.18) 
High_NGIM x High_country 0.002 0.007 -0.013 
(0.15) (0.37) (-0.68) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x High_country -0.107* -0.187*** -0.056** 
(-1.89) (-2.77) (-2.17) 
Constant 0.033** 0.034* 0.019 
(2.10) (1.92) (0.98) 
N 845 845 845 
Adjusted R2 6.4% 7.5% 7.9% 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
This table presents the regression results of the market reaction to non-GAAP disclosures moderated by impression management and country-level 
variables. The definition of variables is as follows. CAR is the three-day cumulative abnormal market return adjusted for country-specific market 
premium, size, and book to market. GAAP_surprise is the difference between GAAP earnings per share and the median consensus GAAP EPS 
forecast, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year. NG_adjustment is the difference between non-GAAP earnings disclosed by managers 
and GAAP earnings, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year. High_NGIM is an indicator variable coded as one if the impression 
management score around non-GAAP disclosures is above the sample median and zero otherwise. High_country is an indicator variable coded one 
if the country’s percentage of institutional ownership, number of analysts, or investor protection is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. In 
column (4) the three country measures are aggregated in two principal components that represent investor sophistication (SOPH) and investor 
protection (PROT). The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significant coefficients at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
Parameter estimates are reported first, followed by robust t-statistics corrected for firm-level clustering in parentheses. 
TABLE 8 - Selection model 
Panel A: Market reaction to non-GAAP adjustments and impression management in in 
different institutional environments 
Institutional 
Investors 
Number of 
analysts 
Investor 
protection 
  (1) (2) (3) 
GAAP_surprise 0.104*** 0.101** 0.103*** 
(3.03) (2.65) (2.72) 
NG_adjustment  0.130*** 0.160*** 0.124*** 
(4.32) (3.54) (4.07) 
High_NGIM 0.030** 0.020 0.037* 
(2.20) (1.30) (1.79) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment -0.055** -0.076** -0.101** 
(-2.56) (-3.26) (-2.15) 
High_country -0.004 -0.034 0.031 
(-0.21) (-1.47) (1.35) 
  NG_adjustment x High_country -0.042 -0.124* -0.058 
(-1.01) (-2.00) (-1.11) 
  High_NGIM x High_country -0.001 0.023 -0.009 
(-0.06) (1.03) (-0.40) 
  High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x High_country -0.099** -0.104*** -0.043** 
(-2.52) (-5.73) (-2.06) 
  NGdisclose 0.039 0.038 0.045 

(1.09) (1.50) (1.25) 
   Mill x NGdisclose -0.150*** -0.139** -0.164*** 
(-4.08) (-2.67) (-4.13) 
   Mill x (1 - NGdisclose) -0.136*** -0.128** -0.145*** 
(-3.45) (-2.88) (-3.34) 
   Constant 0.099*** 0.087** 0.062* 
  (3.25) (2.91) (1.76) 
Adjusted R2 4.9% 6.9% 7.5% 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Panel B: Determinants of non-GAAP disclosure (selection equation) 
  
Institutional 
Investors 
Number of 
analysts 
Investor 
protection 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Analyst expectations 0.142*** 0.133** 0.135*** 
(2.70) (2.31) (2.62) 
Profit growth 0.032 0.039 0.035 
(0.47) (0.58) (0.52) 
Intangibility 0.802** 0.834*** 0.772** 
(2.54) (2.61) (2.47) 
ROA volatility -0.902 -1.010 -0.872 
(-0.77) (-0.89) (-0.76) 
Special items 0.152 0.169 0.130 
(1.36) (1.47) (1.30) 
Size 0.014 0.026 0.010 
(0.27) (0.52) (0.18) 
Leverage -0.187 -0.120 -0.177 
(-0.82) (-0.56) (-0.72) 
High_country -0.153 -0.284* 0.199 
(-0.98) (-1.90) (0.98) 
Constant 0.207 0.125 0.062 
 (0.47) (0.32) (0.17) 
This table presents the estimation results of a selection model that analyzes the market reaction to non-GAAP 
disclosures moderated by impression management and country-level factors. Panel A reports the results for 
the second-stage equation of market reaction, and Panel B reports the results for the first-stage selection 
probit that models the decision to disclosure non-GAAP (NGdisclose). CAR is the three-day cumulative 
abnormal market return adjusted for country-specific market premium, size, and book to market. 
GAAP_surprise is the difference between GAAP earnings per share and the median consensus GAAP EPS 
forecast, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year. NG_adjustment is the difference between non-
GAAP earnings disclosed by managers and GAAP earnings, scaled by share price at the end of the previous 
year. High_NGIM is an indicator variable coded as one if the impression management score around non-
GAAP disclosures is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. High_country is an indicator variable 
coded one if the country’s percentage of institutional ownership, number of analysts, or investor protection is 
above the sample median, and zero otherwise. NGdisclose is an indicator variable coded as one when the firm 
discloses a non-GAAP measure in the press release, and zero otherwise. The variables in Panel B are as 
follows: Analyst Expectations is an indicator variable coded as one if non-GAAP earnings meet or beat the 
analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise. Profit growth is an indicator variable coded as one if non-
GAAP earnings exceed previous year’s GAAP earnings, and zero otherwise. Intangibility is the ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets. Special items is an indicator variable coded as one when the firm reports 
special or extraordinary items, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. High_country is as defined for Panel A. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate 
significant coefficients at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). Parameter estimates are 
reported first, followed by robust t-statistics corrected for firm-level clustering in parentheses.  
